Icon Index Symbol by Atkin, Albert
367
association of general ideas, which operates to cause the sym-
bol to be interpreted as referring to its object” ( 1935a , 249). Th ere 
are numerous examples of symbols, from the various words and 
utterances in human languages to such things as road signs. 
What is crucial in the case of symbols is that there exists some 
underlying convention, agreement, habit, or law that means 
that invoking some symbol invokes its associated object. For 
instance, a red traffi  c light’s being symbolic of a lack of priority 
at a road junction works because we have all agreed (by habit, by 
convention, and by imposing traffi  c regulations) to use red traffi  c 
lights this way . 
 Th roughout his life, Peirce made numerous alterations to his 
account of signs (see, for instance, Short  2004 ), but the broad 
division among icons, indices, and symbols tends to fi nd a place 
throughout. Th ere are, of course, some subtleties to Peirce’s 
account. For instance, it is not clear that there are very many 
examples of signs that are purely iconic, indexical, or symbolic – 
that is, which do not overlap with one or both of the other ele-
ments of the trichotomy. As an example, take a painted portrait 
as a sign of the person it depicts. Th is sign is an icon in that it sig-
nifi es its object in virtue of the qualities it shares with that object – 
the skin and hair color of the depicted person are replicated in 
the painting. But, of course, many of the things that make a por-
trait a successful depiction of its sitter are due to particular con-
ventions governing paintings and how particular blocks of color 
in two dimensions can “stand for” some subject. Th is seems to 
make the painting look as though it has symbolic elements, too. 
Similar considerations hold for indices such as barometers – 
although such signs indicate their objects in virtue of a causal 
and physical connection with their object; conventions about 
how we should interpret this physical connection also seem to 
play a part in signifi cation. What’s more, there are clear instances 
of symbols that have some iconic element. Obvious examples 
might include forms of writing, such as Chinese, that involve 
pictograms, at least partially. Even onomatopoeic words such as 
“cuckoo” present clear cases of symbols with a strong iconic ele-
ment – the phonic qualities of the object are aped by the phonic 
qualities of the word. 
 Peirce was aware of the various overlaps among icons, indi-
ces, and symbols, and at some point proposed to call icons and 
indices with symbolic elements hypo-icons and subindices as 
a way of acknowledging this. However, in any case where more 
than one of the three elements is present, one will be most 
prominent. Consequently, we can think of Peirce’s trichotomy 
as dividing signs according to whether they are  predominantly 
iconic, indexical, or symbolic . 
 Th e main infl uence of Peirce’s division is in  semiotics, 
where his work is considered foundational. However, the icon, 
index, symbol distinction has had some infl uence in philoso-
phy, particularly through the work of  Arthur Burks ( 1949 ), and 
has even been used in such diverse areas as literary theory (see, 
for example, Sheriff   1989 ), fi lm theory (see, for example, Wollen 
 1969 ; see also  film and language ), and musicology (see Turino 
 1999 ; see also  music, language and ). Th e use and relevance of 
this distinction to linguistics are similarly diverse, but it features 
most prominently in analyses of the relation between  animal 
communication and human language and in some expla-
nations of the evolution of language . 
 I 
 ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL 
 Th e nineteenth-century American philosopher  C. S. Peirce devel-
oped extensive sign theories in order to explain  reference , 
meaning,  communication , and cognition. One of the central 
and most innovative features of his theories was the icon, index, 
symbol classifi cation of signs. 
 A crucial aspect of understanding Peirce’s icon, index, sym-
bol division is his account of sign structure. According to Peirce, 
any instance of signifi cation consists of three interrelated parts: a 
sign, an object, and an interpretant. For the sake of simplicity, 
we can think of the sign as the signifi er, for example, a written 
 word or an animal’s footprint. Th e object, on the other hand, 
is whatever is signifi ed, for example, the object denoted by the 
written word or the animal that left the print. Th e interpretant is 
the understanding or interpretation that the sign/object relation 
generates, for example, that the word or utterance is meant to 
refer to its object or that the animal track signifi es the presence 
of the animal that made it. Th e importance of the interpretant 
for Peirce is that signifi cation is not a simple dyadic relationship 
between sign and object: A sign signifi es an object only if it can 
be interpreted as such. 
 With this structure in mind, Peirce was interested in classi-
fying the various ways in which the sign/object relation might 
generate an interpretant. In particular, he thought that a sign 
might come to signify its object, and so generate an interpretant, 
in three possible ways. First, a sign may be understood as signify-
ing in virtue of similarities or shared qualities between it and its 
object. As Peirce says, “I call a sign which stands for something 
merely because it resembles it an icon” ( 1935b , 362). His own 
preferred examples of icons are portraits or mathematical dia-
grams – indeed, he thought icons were especially important to 
mathematical thought. However, we can also include examples 
such as color swatches, sculptures, and so on. What is central to 
iconic signifi cation is that the qualities of the sign are also quali-
ties of the signifi ed object and that this sharing of qualities is cru-
cial in enabling the sign to signify. 
 Th e second way in which a sign might be understood as signi-
fying is in virtue of some physical or causal connection between 
it and its object. Such a sign is an index. Peirce’s own description 
of an index is as “a sign which refers to the object that it denotes 
by virtue of being really eff ected by that object” ( 1935a , 248). 
Again, there are numerous and wide-ranging examples, includ-
ing demonstratives and indexical expressions, weather vanes, 
barometers, fever as a sign of an underlying illness, or smoke 
as a sign of fi re. What is crucial to indices is that the object has 
a causal eff ect upon the sign (as in the case of fi re causing the 
smoke that indicates it) or has some spatio-temporal proximity 
to its sign, which can be used to aid an interpreter of the sign 
to grasp that object (as in the case of pointing to some nearby 
object). 
 Th e third way in which a sign might be understood as signify-
ing is in virtue of some convention or law that connects it to its 
object.  Peirce’s own description of a symbol is as “a sign which 
refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an 
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allows for the symbolic communication typical of human lan-
guage is never attained, and vervet monkey calls and chimpan-
zee symbol manipulation never rise above the level of indexical 
communication . 
 – Albert  Atkin 
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 IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION 
 Th is term was coined by the German social theorist and philoso-
pher  Jürgen Habermas to refer to the conditions necessary for free 
and transparent communication and discussion.  Th e concept of 
ideal speech situation plays a key part in his early formulations of 
a theory of  communicative action and of  universal prag-
matics (Habermas  1979 , 1–68;  1984 ;  1987 ). In his later writings, 
the term has tended to be replaced by  Karl-Otto Apel’s notion 
of an “unrestricted communication community” (Apel  1980 ; 
Habermas  1990 , 88). 
 An ideal speech situation may be understood as the condi-
tions that would allow for open discussion between free and 
equal participants, who strive to come to an agreement upon 
any topic purely through the force of better argument. Th us, the 
participants enter a discussion assuming that their ideas may be 
challenged by any other participant, but that only those ideas 
and arguments that are rationally formulated and supported 
by relevant and persuasive evidence will survive interrogation. 
Th e personality, status, power, or rhetorical abilities of the per-
son holding the idea will be rendered irrelevant in the course of 
debate. 
 Th e idea of an ideal speech situation has its origins in the work 
of the American pragmatist philosopher  Charles Sanders Peirce . 
 In his philosophy of science, Peirce proposed the notion of an ideal 
community of scientists. He recognized that scientifi c research is 
a necessarily communal enterprise. Typically, scientists work in 
 In explaining animal communication, the distinction is espe-
cially useful since it allows us to classify various cases of ani-
mal “language” without treating all such instances as uniform. 
Consequently, a diverse range of animal camoufl age or cases 
of mimicry can be classifi ed as iconic instances of communica-
tion. For example, the harmless milk snake’s mimicking of the 
poisonous coral snake’s red, black, and yellow coloring in order 
to avoid predation is easily explained as an instance of iconic 
communication – these colors mean poisonous!  As for indexical 
communication, a well-discussed case is vervet monkey warning 
calls (see Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler  1980 ; see also  primate 
vocalizations ). In such an example, the calls are classifi able 
as indexical since they rely upon a causal and physical connec-
tion with particular predators in order to refer – the calls are made 
in response to the snakes, eagles, or leopards whose presence is 
perceived. And this is all in contrast to human language, which 
is predominantly symbolic and can enable communication even 
if the objects referred to are not present. Ingar Brinck and Peter 
Gärdenfors ( 2003 ) make compelling use of the icon, index, sym-
bol trichotomy in explaining animal communication where they 
discuss the role of such communication in cooperation . 
 Th e most prominent use and interesting development of 
Peirce’s icon, index, symbol trichotomy is  Terence Deacon’s 
( 1997 ) account of the  coevolution of human language and 
 brains . According to that account, language evolution is to be 
explained by seeing iconic, indexical, and symbolic communi-
cation and reference as related to one another in a hierarchy. 
What this means is that in order to master symbolic communi-
cation, we must fi rst master indexical communication. And in 
order to master indexical communication, we must fi rst master 
iconic communication. For instance, a predator’s inability to 
distinguish the milk snake’s coloring from that of a coral snake 
is suggestive of iconic reference – it is manifest in the preda-
tor’s inability to distinguish one type of snake from the other. 
However, this iconic communication needs to be in place in 
order for the predator to take the coloring of those snakes as 
an indexical signifi er of the poisonous status of the snake – red, 
yellow, and black banding are an index of a venomous snake. 
Other instances of indexical reference work in just this way. It is 
because the vervet monkey sees the eagle above as being quali-
tatively similar to previously experienced eagles (that is, as an 
icon of a recognized predator) that it is able to produce a warn-
ing cry (an indexical reference) when that predator is present. 
Symbolic reference requires the presence of indexicals but also 
requires that the indexical relationship between words/sounds 
and their objects has become ingrained, habitual, and appropri-
ately interconnected with other symbols so that reference and 
communication are maintained even if the stimulus to indexical 
reference is lost or removed. 
 Once this symbolic threshold is achieved, complex relation-
ships between words develop, allowing words to signify other 
words and explain the relationships that exist among them. Such 
a model is useful for explaining various diff erences between 
cases like vervet monkey warning calls, captive chimpanzee 
symbol manipulation, and human language learning – in the 
two former cases, the connection between sign and object is lost 
when the object is absent for sustained periods. Consequently, 
the habituation and interconnectedness of indexical signs that 
 Icon, Index, and Symbol  Ideal Speech Situation 
9780521866897IR.indd   368 2/25/2010   5:46:38 PM
